Since the publication of the Wolfenten Report in 1957 there has been a public debate in England over whether or not immorality alone is a sufficient reason for a criminal sanction or whether criminality should not be imposed unless in addition to sinfulness the proscribed act inflicts social harm. The collateral question, if the above is answered in favor of the sanction, is how do we determine morality and immorality?
Both the Wolfenden Report and the Model Penal Code start out with the premise that law is but one means of social control and there are some areas of private morals that are the distinct concern of religious authority (and perhaps of one's neighbors) and that for utilitarian reasons should not be the additional concern of the criminal law. The case in point most frequently cited is private homosexual conduct between consenting adults. Utilitarians argue that such conduct is not a social harm, enforcement is impracticable if not impossible, and such laws are bound to be administered unfairly, afford an opportunity for blackmail, and tend to become dead letters.
2
Lord Devlin, the principal spokesman for the moral activists, argues that immorality jeopardizes a society's existence, that the function of the criminal lawv is "to enforce a moral principle and nothing else," and that the breach of a moral prin- ciple is an offense against society as a whole.
3 He assumes that there is a considerable degree of moral solidarity and the public is deeply disturbed by infringements of its moral code. Lord Devlin, as distinguished from James Fitzjames Stephens, who took a more extreme position, 4 concedes that a criminal sanction in the name of morality alone is justified only where there is an overwhelming majority sentiment, identifiable by the triple marks of intolerance, indignation, and disgust as felt by the "man in the Clapham omnibus," the "right-minded man," or the "man in the jury box." One may assume that this anonymous entity will be deemed to share the value judgments of Lord Devlin.
The problem of how we should ascertain the moral sentiment of the community has been a vexacious one for able judges and competent scholars.
5 Mr. Justice Jackson once pointed out that judges who attempt to reflect a public judgment must "usually end by condemning all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than we disapprove it." ' Edmond Calm has distinguished three sets of moral standards by which we pass judgment: the standard we require;
3 DEViI.,
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959).
See also Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1962) . 4 LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (2d ed. 1874), written as a reply to John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty (1863). 5 According to Judge Learned Hand, the test for determining moral turpitude is whether or not the conduct conforms to generally accepted moral conventions current at the time, without regard to the judge's personal view or conscience. He admitted that there was no scientific way to determine a community consensus. Judge Jerome Frank, however, insisted that the trial judge should take evidence as to what the community thinks in order to ascertain the "attitude of our ethical leaders." John Chipman Gray took the position that the judge should follow his own notions as to moral turpitude. See CAEN, THE MORAL DECISION 300-12 (1955) .
6Dissenting in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (1951) . See also Carrington, Tie Moral Quality of the Criminal Law, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 575 (1959) , where Professor Carrington takes the position that prohibition in the name of public morality impairs private morality, interferes with rehabilitation, and impairs freedom of the individual unnecessarily. He would eradicate the moral element from criminal law. the standard we desire; and the standard we revere Infractions of the first we punish, we preach about and praise the second, and the third is for saints and heroes. It also has been demonstrated that there may be a wide gap between the public morality assumed to exist by legislators and judges and the true vox populi imposition of criminal penalties and challenges the moralists to produce empirical evidence as to why sin should be made criminal. He doubts Lord Devlin's assumption that immorality jeopardizes society's existence and calls for supporting proof. In the case of sexual misconduct, he would punish public indecency but not private immorality.
As has been pointed out, from the standpoint of the orthodox theory of criminal law, Professor Hart is on solid ground.
14 The Shaw case, although a triumph for the legal moralists, did violence to the principle of legality in that the count on conspiring to corrupt public morals was applied ex post facto, and the offense was not stated with precision. From the time of Bentham it had been assumed that the nature and function of the criminal law was utilitarian in accordance with the theory of pain and pleasure, and that there should be rational debate about public decision making. Moreover, such pragmatic criteria as efficaciousness as a deterrent, whether a sanction would do more social harm than good, or whether it was needless, implemented the principle of utility. On the contrary, Lord Devlin's position becomes irrational, the reprobation of the common man becoming decisive, instead of a mere factor to be considered.
Although logic supports the argument that the principle of legality is offended by loose common law nuisance or conspiracy statutes, vagrancy ordinances, and obscenity laws, it must be conceded that popular sentiment may support the proposition that "there ought to be a law against it." It may be both easy and popular to legislate against and to condemn sin. And there may be a folk feeling that not to do so may provoke the wrath of the gods. After all, the Emperor Justinian claimed homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes! In fact, the most forceful argument for the legal moralists is the reprobative theory that it is one of the functions of the criminal law to give expression to the collective feeling of revulsion toward certain acts and that it is vain to preach that any society must repress its feelings. 15 Lord Devlin failed to make the most of this argument, and Professor Hart tried to side step it by shifting the burden of proof, i.e., he conceded that justification might exist but called for proof.
After asserting that interference with individual liberty is a harm requiring justification, and insisting that not only punishment but the inhibition of freedom of choice is such an interference, in a spirited passage Professor Hart claims that there is "no evidence.., to show that deviation from accepted sexual morality, even by adults in private, is something which, like treason, threatens the existence of society. No reputable historian has maintained this thesis, and there is much against it."" Following this assault on Lord Devlin's major premise, the concession is made that if deviations from conventional sexual morality are tolerated by the law and come to be known, the conventional morality may change in a permissive direction, even though such has not been the case in those European countries where homosexuality is not a crime and although "there is very little evidence to support the idea that morality is best taught and sustained without it."' 7
The concession that if deviations are tolerated by the law, conventional morality may change in reaction to such permissiveness, is an interesting one. It constitutes half-hearted recognition that law influences social change rather than merely reacts to it, and that there may be an educational function which law serves. The importance of preserving the moral (and educational) quality of the criminal law has been stressed and disputed by other recent writings.u As a practical matter, it may be doubted whether the penal code is often consulted as a guide to morality, and it has been said that to equate legality with morality is to accept the morals of a scoundrel. 19 Criminal law at best reflects a minimum ethic, and as a deterrent or influence there must be some certainty as to enforcement.
In the United States it has been estimated that at least 95 percent of the population have committed sex offenses. One study contends that there are only 20 convictions for every 6,000,000 homosexual acts per year. 2 We may also say, with some assurance, that it is unprofitable, i.e., it does more harm than good to make sin a crime when it involves private acts by freely consenting adults." Whether it is needless, or the deviation may be effectively discouraged or prevented without punishment, is a moot point,U but to the extent that subconscious drives are involved, a vague fear of uncertain punishment would seem to be relatively insignificant, at least when compared with other sanctions such as the esteem of one's fellow man.' 5 We agree with Hart's instance as to the importance of keeping in mind that the question of morality vis i vis the law enters the picture twice6-first as a source and critique of the law, and second in connection with the problem here discussed, namely, whether the enforcement of 21 Id. at 156. 22 As reported in the December 17, 1963, issue of The New York Times. The article also quoted a psychiatrist as stating he had "cured" only 27 per cent of the 106 male homosexuals he had treated, that 83 per cent of them said they would not want their sons to be homosexuals, but that 97 per cent said they would not change their own homosexuality. 33 (1964) . 24 Obviously, it cannot be known whether or not some deviation is deterred by the threat of criminal penalty. 21 We may accept Max Rheinstein's postulate that there are four norm systems which have different sanctions: etiquette, which employs the sanctions of ridicule and ostracism; morality, normally furthered by conscience or super-ego; religion, backed up by supernatural penalties; and government, which imposes sanctions by the civil and criminal law. In many ways the law provides the crudest of sanctions, for as pointed out by Bentham, the law teaches us right conduct the same way we instruct a dog: we beat him when he does wrong.
26At p. 17.
morality by the criminal processes is itself morally justified. To pose the question another way, how high a price should we be willing to pay for making sin illegal? The common law, with its attitude towards nonfeasance, long has been willing to tolerate human fraility.Y Moreover, some who feel that secularization of the law was a great historic achievement will concur with James Bryce, who argued that "the effort to base legal rules on moral and religious principles leads naturally to casuistry, and away from that common-sense view of human transactions and recognition of practical consequences which ought to be the basis for law."
''
The common sense conclusion to be gathered from the great debate over the Wolfenden Report is that (1) criminal statutes probably will be kept on the books as long as they reflect a popular sense of reprobation, but (2) such statutes will not be effectively enforced and may occasion more social harm than good unless backed up by a clear consensus of the community. 29 In New York, for example, at the present time there may be no clear cut consensus that adultery laws should be enforced, and in England and elsewhere there may have been a change of attitude regarding homosexuality. The homosexual, along with the addict and the alcoholic, today may be regarded as a medical problem, as long as public decency is not affronted and no overt harm is done to others.
Thus, it would seem, the debate ends in a draw. The moralists usually will secure the retention of statutes against sin that they regard as essential for the preservation of society, but will be frustrated by ineffectual enforcement. The skeptics and Professor Hart will not ordinarily secure statutory repeal, but they will have the satisfaction of knowing that desuetude will set in. Perhaps Lord Devlin should ponder the warning of Spinoza that "He who tries to fix and determine everything by law will inflame rather than correct the vices of the world,"
30 and perhaps Professor Hart should harken to Holmes' warning that the first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong. ' Until we get a science of sanctions, the debate probably will continue on a philosophical level, and "living law" will continue to be at odds with the morality we profess on the statute books. It is quite difficult to be The Hero in a world strangely intransigent and insensitive to its own best interests as these are determined and administered by You. But former Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, despite the obstacles, carried on valiantly for more than 30 years and provides a partial accounting of his efforts in The Murderers. It is hardly a subtle book, as put together by journalist Will Oursler, but rather is filled with numerous timeworn cliches about narcotics, a running barrage of coy prurience (the book is filled with nude female corpses which, when less moribund, had been engaged in "perverse" activities and "unprintable sex rituals"), and some reasonably interesting stories of courage and intelligence by government agents devoted to the duty of apprehending narcotic peddlers and smugglers.
Mostly, The Murderers will be remembered for two extraordinarily indiscrete disclosures by its author. After a comment to the effect that he is not "a believer.., in 'ambulatory treatment'," Anslinger proceeds to report a pair of cases in which on his personal initiative he saw to it that addicts were provided with drugs. Curiously, in both instances procedures equivalent to those employed in Great Britain were used. In the first case, Anslinger arranged for a pharmacist to reduce gradually the dosage of demerol being purchased by "a society matron, a beautiful, gracious lady." By this ruse, the addict reportedly was weaned from dependence on the drug.
In the second instance, a case that has been cited 31 TnE COMMON LAW 41-42 (1938 ed.) . [Vol. 55 with deadly polemic effectiveness by Professor Lindesmith, Anslinger blandly tells of his decision to allow morphine to be provided by a designated pharmacist to a prominent United States Senator, an "intractable" man ("he refuses even to consider undergoing medical treatment"). "I did not like the situation but I felt we had no other course open to us because of the national and international aspect of the problem," Anslinger says in an attempt to defend his action. The situation, ugly enough itself, is made even more unsightly by Anslinger's nonchalant acknowledgment that when a newspaper reporter became aware of the arrangement, the latter was warned that, were he to print the details, "the Harrison Narcotic Act provided a two-year jail term for anyone revealing the narcotic records of a drug store." In obvious satisfaction with a job well done, Anslinger comments: "That ended that."
As might be expected Anslinger is unrelenting in his denunciation of the narcotic peddler and in his derogatory labeling of those who oppose Bureau policies ("They come chiefly from the left wing"). The book, however, also supplies a good deal of casual documentation of corruption among civil servants with whom Anslinger has had contact, though its author is unable to bring to bear on these cases the same righteous indignation that is so readily summoned when the subject is the narcotic trade. Thus, with no further comment, we have the offhand observation that when two undercover Bureau agents were arrested in New Orleans "they were beaten daily by the authorities trying to find out who they really were."
The potpourri in the volume conforms closely to material generally contained in books of its genre. There is a standard chapter on the Mafia, an Ambler-like section on international narcotic intrigue in the Balkans, and a good deal of thinlyveiled celebrity name dropping concerning those in the limelight who have not been quite as wellbehaved as the Bureau would have preferred (e.g., tales concerning a "sword-flashing hero who played the role of a pirate"). Anslinger also takes the opportunity to rebut some of the allegations of Alexander King (Mine Enemy Grows Older and May This House Be Safe from Tigers), and, at least to this reviewer, in this instance the Bureau commissioner comes out far ahead. King's freeswinging caterwauling looks quite lame when his accusations are compared and his record examined more closely.
The Commissioner fares less well in diverse attempts to paint an attractive picture of the "special employees" of the Bureau, the narcotics informers, and it is obvious that at times he has trouble convincing himself that there is much to be said for them besides the fact that they enable the Bureau to resolve 90 per cent of the cases it dears up. There is no mention, for instance, of what the New York Times a few years ago called "the sordid story of the degradation of a 29-yearold veteran by a Government narcotics informer." This story told of a "special employee," paid $40 to $60 for each case he "made," who systematically enmeshed non-users in addiction and then subsequently turned them into the government for a reward.
The Murderers was published just before Commissioner Anslinger retired in mid-1962 upon reaching the age of 70. In it, he tells how as a boy of 12 in Altoona, Pennsylvania, he witnessed a woman scream with pain because she needed her morphine ration. It created in the youngster, as he remembers the incident, "a loathing" for the phenomenon of addiction. It may have been this emotion, at least in part, which dictated the official attitude of the United States government toward narcotic drugs, and which, after the passage of more than three decades, recently led the President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse to recommend that the Bureau of Narcotics be transferred from the Department of Treasury to the Department of Justice (investigation and control of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs) and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (regulation of the legitimate importation, manufacture and sale of drugs for medical use). In its own way, The Murderers tells a good deal about the reasons that led the Commission to its decision.
GUIERT Traditionally there have been two types of criminal law books on the German market, the dogmatic treatise and the code commentary. The treatises, typically the work of university professors, present the subject matter as a logically constructed, systematically organized body of knowledge. They are theoretical works of erudition and immense pedagogical value and influence, which for generations have imbued fledgling German lawyers not only with the requisite knowledge of positive law, but also with the academician's systematic approach. The well-known American treatises by Hall, Perkins, and Wingersky (Clark & Marshall, 6th ed.), or the older works by Bishop and Wharton, are the closest American equivalents. The code commentaries, more frequently the work of judges and practitioners, have always served the practice of criminal law. These lack an original structure, being bound by the organization of the code. The entirely different approaches in the two types of books have always made for a rift between university and practice, more so in Germany than in America (where the systemacy of the common law is more likely to prevail in both types of books).
It was Professor Schoenke who with his "Penal Code Commentary" sought to bridge the gap, and it was left to Professor Schroeder to complete the task during the past decade. Schoenke-Schroeder's commentary presents the successful amalgamation of the code commentary and the treatise. The mature 11th edition, which is now before usSchroeder produced five substantially revised editions within ten years-, follows the organization of the German penal code, but it does so with a superstructure and with substructures which are purely of the scholar's doing and which serve predominantly pedagogical purposes. More particularly, Schroeder used three devices to turn the code itself into an instrument of pedagogy:
(1) The first 47 pages are a purely scholarly (fine-print) exposition of the history and reform of German criminal law, an introduction to foreign and comparative criminal law (with an unfortunately outdated coverage of American criminal law literature), and a superb discussion of the German crime concept from the German, especially Schroeder's own, perspective. (For a summary presentation in English, see Schroeder, Introduclion, THE GERMAN PENAL CODE 1-14, vol. 4, AJE CAN SERIES OF FOREIoN PENAL CODES, by Mueller & Buergenthal, 1961.) This high-level theoretical discussion serves as a pace-setter and as a general standard for the more specific discussions to follow in the body of the book.
(2) Many of the specific provisions of the code, singly or in groups, are prefaced by self-contained little treatises explanatory of the purposes and problems of the law in question, in clear language, convincing organization, and with detailed references to decisions and the secondary literature, as well as cross references.
(3) Following the black-letter rule of each one of the code sections, there appears a treatise-like analysis of the positive law established by the section. Here, too, Professor Schroeder has created his own organization and conscientiously refers to all leading cases and the secondary authorities.
The production and constant updating of this mammoth work, with its mass of references and intricate and detailed analysis of even the most minute and obscure point of law, must have been a task of well-nigh super-human dimensions. Any potential writer of a criminal law book had better take a look at this work-the most outstanding of all textual treatments of criminal law (of any country) of which I am aware. This is not idle advice, in view of the fact that the long-expected annotated version of the Model Penal Code is about to make its appearance in America, and that the continuing trend of state codifications will necessitate the production of books for which Schoenke-Schroeder is bound to be the Himalayan model.
A brief review cannot possibly attempt an analysis of the views presented in the dogmatic parts of the book. Some of Schroeder's views are well-known in this country, where he has taught, lectured, published, and acquired many friends. Suffice it to say that not only is he keenly aware of all the currents and cross-currents of German criminal theory, but he himself has played-and continues to play-a leading role in the development of German theory and practice. Divergences of opinion are constantly pointed out in the text, with Schroeder himself always taking a position. More often than not, this is the prevailing viewbecause Schroeder made it such. In sum, Schroeder's Strafgesetzbuch-Komrentar is the ultimate authority. And if this were not the case anyway in a nation where the academician ranks higher than the practitioner or judge, it would be [Vol. 55 for the fact that Schroeder is a supreme court judge as well as an academician, and thus represents the best of both branches of the profession.
The same publishing company which published Schoenke-Schroeder's work has also just produced the 25th edition of a "Short-Commentary" on the German penal code. It may seem a semantic mockery to call a book of nearly 1400 pages a "short" commentary. But a description of the work will make it dear that "short" refers to the commentaries, though perhaps not to the totality of the work. In addition to an annotated version of the German penal code, this book contains 54 other pieces of penal legislation with annotations. Among these are the various laws for the protection of minors, military penal law, traffic laws, public health laws, and the host of regulatory penal statutes and decrees which in every nation exists side-by-side with the penal code proper. Where Schroeder could put 540 words of commentary on a 5"1 x 7M" print block, the author of the "short-commentary" had to make do with 350 words on a 3ff x 5j4" print block. This makes it dear that the "short-commentary" is meant to be a handy reference work to all substantive German penal legislation. But while "handy reference" may often refer to something not attaining scholarly standards, the "short-commentary" is a work of astonishingly high academic quality. Whether by arrangement or accident, the "short-commentary" has resorted to the very same three devices which, in my opinion, raised the Schoenke-Schroeder commentary from a practitioner's guide to a scholarly treatise. Frequently the theoretical level of the discussions and the references to decisional and scholarly authority are as elaborate in the "short" as in the long commentary. The "short commentary," too, depicts a keen awareness of the trends of scholarly thought and of the need for, and efforts at, reform. But who was qualified to accomplish all this in a "short commentary"? Dr. Dreher, who has guided the work through the last three editions, is in fact the Chief Reporter of the German government reform commission for a new penal code and, thus, the principal architect of the prospective German penal legislation. He is soon to make his first appearance in print in the United States, with the "Introduction" to the volume on the German Draft Penal Code, in the American Series of Foreign Penal Codes. In Germany he has long been regarded as one of the most thoughtful criminalists, and as the ideal reformer, who combines the wisdom of the past with the vision of the future, and who is as adept in penal philosophy (see his book Ueber die gerechte Strafe, 1947) as in matters of practical criminal law, as the instant volume attests.
Dr. Dreher should be congratulated for having produced an excellent 25th annivesary edition of a book which began before, and outlasted, the Hitlerian holocaust, and which is once again a favorite guide for Germany's theory-conscious practitioners. Under this act the Court may put an offender on probation with the requirement that he accept treatment for an improvement of his mental condition. The Court takes the initial action and determines whether or not a probation order under this act shall be issued; however, such probation orders must be made on the advice and evidence of medical wit. nesses (psychiatrists) that the mental condition of the convicted offender requires and may be susceptible to treatment, but is not such as to justify the offender's being certified as a person of unsound mind or mentally defective. The probation order extends for only 12 months and must be agreed to by the offender. Treatment (spelled out in the probation order) by or under the direction of a qualified medical practitioner may be nonresident (with an out-patient cinic or as a patient of an individual medical practitioner) or resident (in a hospital or a mental nursing home). Should the offender at a later date fail to comply with the treatment requirements he is subject to legal sanction.
Out of a total of 882 probationers with a section 4 requirement made by magistrates and higher courts in 1953 throughout England, the author was able to collect data from local probation officer ; for a case study of 636 cases. The criminal offenses resulting in probation status ranged from minor offenses of loitering, drunkenness, and minor thefts to burglary, assault, and attempted murder. Property offenses led. There were 67 offenses of homosexuality and 65 offenses of attempted suicide. Of these 636 cases 13.5 per cent had more than three previous convictions; 322 received residential treatment, 314 were nonresidential patients. The reviewer would like more ir. ormation about the following aspects of the population: number of recidivists, the nature of previous criminal charges and convictions, offenders' home backgrounds, and age and sex breakdown.
From this population of 636 cases, three successive series of cases were analyzed: (1) probationers under medical care (414); (2) (1) Medical reports were available for 414 patients who were examined and treated by many different psychiatrists in numerous hospitals in various parts of the country. Of these, 195 were diagnosed as psychopaths, 28 as having low intelligence, 58 as schizophrenics, and 5 with no ascertainable abnormality. The reviewer questions the inclusion of any of these cases under section 4. Moreover the application of a single-label diagnosis appears untenable. Where were the mixed cases? Psychotherapy, occupational therapy, and electrical and surgical treatment constituted primary treatment methods. The reviewer wonders about the 22 out of 414 probationers where no treatment was feasible, and 22 other cases where treatment procedures were unknown (44 cases). Table 9 , p. 30.
Seventy per cent of 369 probationers at the conclusion of their mental treatment were discharged with their condition improved or showing some benefit from treatment. The author demonstrates that this proportion does not differ from what is generally regarded as a fair rate of recovery of mental patients. Tables of medical prognoses classified according to the offenses committed demonstrated exhibitionists to have particularly good prospects under medical treatment, while thieves have the highest proportion of unfavorable prognoses. How were the 369 cases on which there were medical prognoses selected? How many were men, women? How long were these cases under medical treatment? Were they out-patients or resident patients? The author neglected to discuss the relationship of medical prognoses to type of mental disorders.
(2) Out of 369 cases for whom full medical and probation reports were available, 239 probationers (64.7 per cent) responded well to medical treatment. A close correlation was found between favorable medical prognoses and satisfactory response to the probation officers' approach. It is reported that out of 403 probationers who had undergone mental treatment, 254 (or 63 per cent) terminated probation satisfactorily, i.e.: (1) without a court appearance or, (2) without any other incident which "indicated that it was not possible to reach the intended aim" (this criterion is unclear).
(3) Post probation success was measured by reconviction rates within a follow-up period of one year after the termination of probation. Of 393 former probationers (we are not told how these 393 were selected) 162 out of 362 male offenders and 10 out of 67 female offenders were reconvicted. Highest reconviction rates were among young men 17 to 21, psychopaths, and those convicted of acquisitive crime. Low reconviction rates were found for those convicted of offenses against the person and those discharged from medical treatment with favorable prognosis. There was more than a 50-50 chance of post probation success for offenders who did not appear to benefit from medical treatment. This finding is explained on the basis of the probation officers' case-work success during the period following medical treatment.
Throughout the work the author favorably compares the success rates of his three population groups with national success rates for mental patients and other probationers. He advocates the extended use of probation orders under section 4 (only 882 of 29,931 probationers were under section 4 orders in 1953) instead of traditional punishments for offenders who commit offenses from pathological motives. He points to the difficulty of finding places for probationers in mental hospitals. He contends that the chances for a successful treatment are better if the medical practitioner who testifies as an expert witness on the advisability of mental treatment and the practitioner who undertakes the treatment are one and the same. The relationship between the psychiatrist responsible for medical treatment and the probation officer in charge of the offender's supervision needs further consideration-the implication is that these two should work more closely together throughout the [Vol. 55 probation process. He maintains that the section 4 statutory time limit of 12 months should be made more flexible. He suggests that some offenders formerly considered for section 4 probation may be handled under Section 60 of the Mental Health Act, 1959, which gives English courts power to make guardianship orders and hospital orders for certain types of mental disorders (e.g., psychopaths). The reviewer strongly concurs.
Professor Griinhut brilliantly describes the content and ideal operation of present English legal provisions in reference to probation and mental treatment. Tabular presentation of the data did not always make clear that the populations under discussion were mutually exclusive. This work is heartily recommended to the correctional practitioner as well as to the theoretical criminologist. 
350.
Mr. Norman, Director of Detention Services, NCCD, has written an informative "how to," "what to," and, most importantly, "who to" booklet on emergency shelter care for neglected and dependent children, which term includes delinquents who need shelter but not secure custody. This is one facet of a program in delinquency prevention. He points out a philosophy of shelter care and gives practical suggestions for shelter operation.
The call for "emergency" shelter, according to Mr. Norman, often indicates casework planning which is too late, in that a family situation has been permitted to attain crisis stage before action has been taken by previous plan.
Too often (as in public handling of delinquents, also) the police and the community remove children from their homes by sudden and violent action. In many cases, pre-planning and even coolheadedness in an alleged emergency can locate substitutes (neighbors, relatives, etc.) for public care. (With delinquents, local state study indicates that many or most of the children placed in detention homes or jails after a complaint may be safely left at home and brought to official attention the next day, in lieu of automatic confinement of a child in jail or detention.) Strongly emphasized is that shelter care is not properly given in a detention home, nor in a facility attached to a detention home but distinctly apart.
Short stay in a shelter is advocated, with continuing casework. The essential features of an acceptable shelter care are: availability at all hours of the day, conformity to health and safety standards, home-like atmosphere, etc.
Basic to all shelter care is the availability of sound case work service to the children and families concerned. With local variations, shelter care is thought best administered by a public agency dealing with protective services but definitely not by a court agency.
A question is raised: In a number of states, the juvenile court has legal responsibility for neglect and dependency, as well as delinquency. This booklet points to a trend away from these responsibilities, urging removal from the court of active dealing with neglect and dependency, and urging that case work be handled by a public child protective agency other than the court. This rearrangement of duties would leave the court with the legal questions of guardianship and custody and the enforcement of support payments. In some areas, co-existing legal responsibility for neglect and dependency is reported in public welfare departments. Possibly, this needs clarification in the law relating to children.
As a corollary, this booklet also points to the need for protective agencies, public and private, to re-examine their services to "delinquents." Too often, an adjudged "delinquent" is, ipso facto, barred from consideration for protective services in shelter care and foster home placement. Possibly protective services are frightened by the specter of a delinquency label. on a child. Too often, then, the absence of such community services (other than a state training school for delinquents) forces the court to provide community foster care by its own efforts, which role is contrary to the thinking of this booklet.
One wonders about the glossing over, in this work, of the strong prohibitions against receiving infants in shelter care and leaving them for other than a short stay. This booklet says almost nothing in this area.
"Perspectives and principles" is the sub-title of the volume on police work with children by .[yren and Swanson. The heads of major national police and delinquency groups are in agreement with the major proposals, though with some expressed differences in details. Speaking generally, the pamphlet says: (1) Without the full support of the police administrator, the work of a juvenile police bureau or officer is meaningless. (2) There is urgent need to safeguard the legal rights of children in interrogation, detention, taking into custody, and charging a child with an offense. (3) This work calls for more explicit legal guidelines in administrative policy. In many instances, the law is not dear, and much discretion is vested in the execution of these juvenile police duties which remain in a gray area of precedent and guidelines.
The authors call for careful separation and coordination of functions between the police and the juvenile court with sincere effort to define the area of competence and responsibility of each agency. This, of course, is best worked out by agreement.
Juvenile police (distinct from other police) function best in these areas: (1) aiding the administrator to formulate and implement overall departmental policy with juveniles; (2) investigation and follow up of complaints made to the officer on the beat; (3) review of reports of police contact with juveniles; (4) liaison with community agencies.
Not recommended for the juvenile officer are these special functions: (1) routine preventive patrols, (2) receiving complaints from citizens, and (3) public relations.
The authors call for a juvenile staff on duty in the evenings and at night, contrary to some present policy of using these officers only on the day shift. (It is found that the availability of a juvenile officer at all hours can spell the difference between routinely placing a juvenile in detention or jail as against releasing him to his family, where the latter may be done with safety to the child and the community.)
Most interesting, however, is the careful delineation of the law governing police work with juveniles. (20-38) Here, as in the following sections, the materials are supported by legal references and court cases.
The same kind of citations (with references to recent literature) follow on police procedure with delinquency cases, with abuse and neglect, with truancy and ungovernability, with absconding, escape, and runaways.
Of special interest are the cases illustrative of appropriate degree of police action in delinquency cases in progress (at the time the officer arrives), not in progress, and in minor cases. This type of gradation offers excellent guidelines.
The volume is designed for juvenile police. It may also be read profitably by judges, probation officers, visiting teachers, and all others interested in delinquency prevention as well as in the protection of citizens, even juvenile citizens, in their legal rights. In completing his magnum opus, v. Hentig achieved something in his specialty, criminology, that will be talked about, and referred to, for many years to come. In his Introduction, the author draws a broad picture of various hypotheses of "man in his society," referring to man's constitution, depths of man's character structure, being (Dasein), and individuality (Eigenleben), and the dynamics underlying the human personality. For instance, the old controversy in criminology (starting with Lombroso) whether the criminal is the product of heredity or of environment is one which v. Hentig simply sums up with the statement that today's scientists take into account only the average individual and his average environment (Durchschnittsumwelt), and that punishment is made the basis for a decision due to the "motivating power or force of an artificially produced lifeenergy" (Motivkraft einer kuenstlich hergeslelten Lebenskraft). Von Hentig asks the question whether freedom of the will remains between constitutional elements and consciousness (Bewussiseinsinhall). Without mentioning Kant, v. Hentig returns to the concept of the "moral imperative" as still the major empirical experience which is our modernday super ego ideal, a super ego which either func-[Vol. 55 tions or does not function. Impulses can overwhelm man, and impulse-controls may or may not work. But, according to v. Hentig, "everything is still constitutionally determined." Can modem criminologists agree with v. Hentig?
Like v. Hentig's other works, the present volume, too, abounds in statistics from the world over, in copious footnotes (again no bibliography!), and in very systematic and thoroughgoing organization of his material. The three parts of the third volume are concerned with variables of sex, ages of man and races in the first part (with a great deal of discussion of race-relations and race violence in the United States), and with personality characteristics (Anlagekraefte) and crime in the second. Like its predecessors, the vast material presented in this volume probably defies even superficial examination here. Perhaps a few examples will saffice to let the reader taste a few raisins out of a rich cake.
Certain features and topics which v. Hentig touches on are rarely seen in American criminologica these days. For instance, physiological variables in ciiminals are generally disregarded in this country. Yet v. Hentig devotes several chapters to the beard and hair of criminals, to "ugliness" of appearance, a special chapter on "red hair" (the phenomenon of red hair among criminals was quite popular in the American literature decades ago), left-handedness (which is no longer as rare among the German population as before World War II) as well as language and picturesymbolism from groups of criminals-in other words, shades of Lombroso. It would seem to me that these chapters are but little paralleled in the Anglo-Saxon literature and hence would make profitable reading, if for no other reason than to measure the validity of v. Hentig's statistical material and conclusions by comparison with present-day material among criminologists elsewhere.
Not so rare in the Anglo-Saxon literature are the occupational trends among criminals, although, because of the still deeply entrenched German caste system, v. Hentig has material to present which differs essentially from comparative sources in this country. For instance, "Service" (or, better still, what I may call in jest "servitude") occupations, such as those of waiters, cooks, male nurses, and grave diggers each get a chapter, and so do the occupations which "make life easier," such as law, theology, and medicine, or the occupations of teachers and actors. The American reader will be interested to learn from v. Hentig, for instance, that in Germany criminals among district attorneys are rare. Where cases are cited, the author has to lean on quotations from American sources! Similarly, criminality among the dergy is rare in Germany, and, again, American sources seem to present more cases than German. However, in the chapter on physicians, also relying heavily on American sources, v. Hentig makes the grave error of omitting entirely the Nazi era, in which physicians played a criminal role (fatal to many thousands of concentration-camp inmates), notorious both in the gravity of their crimes and in the number of criminal "physicians," some of whom are still in hiding (like Drs. Blies, Brandt, Conti, Eberl, Endres, the infamous Dr. Eisele, Fehringer, Fischer, Fritze, Grawitz, Haagen, Hirt, Hofer, Koenig, Lane, Herta Oberheuser-one of the few women-physicians-, Pokomy, Rosenthal, Ruge, Schuhmann, Schulze, and Wolter, a list by no means complete). This reviewer, being psychoanalytically trained, does not subscribe to v. Hentig's methods of research, findings, and philosophy. Yet, what I stated on previous occasions I may repeat again: at worst, v. Hentig's writings are stimulating and a rich source of material for any student in criminology; at best, v. Hentig remains the towering international figure, the peer of Leon Radzinowitz, to whom this volume is dedicated.
One of the chapters of Vol. III concerning occupational trends deals with grave-diggers. To the student of v. Hentig's writings, death, graves, corpses, and so on appear to be v. Hentig's favorites in criminological examinations. Some years ago, the author devoted a book to the last supper of condemned men (Die Henkersmahlzeit). Now, he devotes a monograph, entitled Der nekrotope Mensck, to the law-breakers who either engage in necrophilia or rob corpses or cemeteries. Again, the author with his German thoroughness describes the entire scale of beliefs about the life hereafter of these offenders, without becoming involved in religious issues. Of the four chapters, it seems that the main one is devoted to the syndrome of necrophilia. The non-psychoanalytically-minded reader will have to forgive the author for omitting many insights that psychoanalysis has contributed to a dynamic -understanding of this relatively rare syndrome. I believe v. Hentig merely describes necrophilia adynamically and arrives at his con-clusions only from a sociological point of view, which, to me, does not explain much. Von Hentig has collected cases from many sources, some as old (and completely dated) as Lombroso, some as recent and controversial (if not also dated and often false) as de River. Theoretically, v. Hentig seems to be on better ground in relying on Hans Huber's Nekrophilie, Krimhialislik or on Sir Norwood East's Society and the Criminal, particularly when these writers attempt to distinguish between necrophilia (i.e., masturbation with a corpse) and sexual attack on a corpse after the victim was murdered.
Undoubtedly, this monograph will contribute greatly to the sociology and criminology of necrophilia. The German word "nekrotop" (the author probably using the word interchangeably with "necrophiliac") is probably the author's own coinage. I was unable to find the word in the most recent three-volume edition of Duden (1962) . The language is lucid and, as in the author's larger works, written for several levels of understanding that can well include the layman, although I doubt whether the layman would be interested in the "nekrotopic" man.
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